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Within South Africa, clearly defined (and admini-
stratively distinct) geographical zones exist for
which a centrally organised and separate policy of
regional development has been devised. These are
referred to as 'homelands'.
The 'homelands' plan introduced in the late l950s
as perhaps the most charàcteristic (and contro-
versial) feature of a more precisely defined
apartheid policy, envisioned the establishment of a
number of essentially tribally based 'independent'
Black states within South Africa. Originally, the
intention was to settle the majority of the blacks in
the country (comprising some four-fifths of the total
population) into these separate locations which, in
all, make up little more than 15 per cent of the total
land area. Apart from the problem that many of the
homelands are fragmented (making their admini-
stration particularly difficult in a country pre-
serving 'pass laws') most will never possess more
than a nominal autonomy and none will receive
true international recognition of their independent
status.
To many people both within South Africa and out-
side, these nominally independent entities do not
exist; they are regarded merely as a political
creation of the ruling regime and a manifestation of
national ideology and official philosophy. Any
acceptance of their existence would, it is felt, imply
the need to accord some recognition to apartheid.
This paper, whilst recognising the fact of
apartheid (and the widespread implications of such
an approach) in no way condones it. 'It simply tries
to analyse the socio-economic conditions and
regional policy strategy implied by such a
philosophy, and questions whether 'homeland'
policy can achieve the declared primary, objective
to promote the development of the indigenous
Africans.
The stated intention of the South African govern-
ment's apartheid policy and its associated 'home-
land' philosophy is that as non-Europeans establish
their own residential areas, they will also develop
Since most development problems are essentially concerned
with questions of redistribution and structural change to help
alleviate poverty and pauperisation amongst the least privi-
leged, any policy of separate development is, prima facie,
inappropriate.
their own economic strategy and staff the offices,
schools, police force, hospitals, etc under their
control. It is alleged - or hoped - there will be
opportunities for individual economic advance-
ment (as well as social development) not hitherto
open to blacks. A policy with similar objectives,
carried out elsewhere in Africa and not based on
any discriminatory political philosophy, would
contain certain economic aspects which probably
would have been favourably regarded and in so far
as the policy is directed towards the promotion of
economic development and employment and
employment opportunities for the poor, there is
little to quarrel with. But as part of the general
ideology of apartheid, no aspect of this strategy can
be regarded as acceptable. This is because the
strategy has been evolved within the context of
ultimate objectives which are contrary to the true
meaning of development.
In any 'homeland' area, the very nature of the
development process, quite apart from the rate of
economic progress, is constrained by the domin-
ance of the South African economy - not only in
market operations but in the utilisation of all
factors of production. This all-pervading depen-
dency constrains policy options. Thus it renders
quite irrelevant any development planning based
on the evaluation and exploitation of regional
physical resources. This process involves invest-
ment in expensive capital intensive projects which,
by their very nature, restrict employment oppor-
tunities. Such projects, in drawing on scarce
resources, tend to jeopardise other programmes
directed towards raising general levels of agri-
cultural production and rural living standards.
Moreover, much of current 'homeland' develop-
ment accentuates dependence on outside finance
and institutions. This external sovereign power
makes all the key decisions on behalf of the regional
authorities, despite the apparent administrative and
political independence of the local ministerial
councils.
Some of the basic problems associated with any
attempt to implement 'independent' economic and
social policies within a 'homeland' area are des-
cribed below in relation to the Ciskei. Geographic-
ally, this is a narrow corridor of land mainly
comprising the Keiskamma River catchment area.
This strip lies roughly north-south and is bounded
on the south and south-east by the Indian Ocean
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and to the north by the Winterburg and Hogsback
mountain ranges. In the west the country is
hemmed in by the Great Fish River and its
tributary, the Kat. The whole corridor lies due west
of the main communications route from East
London through King Williams Town up to
Cathcart and Queenstown. The region has no port,
and no town of any significance. It is estimated that,
in 1980, the total population will reach around
475,000, of whom two-thirds will be rural.
Most of the urban population lives either in
Mdantsane, a dormitory town serving the industrial
centre of East London, or in Zwelitsha, another
black township serving the needs of King Williams
Town. The area as a whole is isolated and lacks
both technology and investment capital as well as
independent access to either. Furthermore, many of
the original Xhosa inhabitants have migrated to the
Witwatersrand, Durban and Cape Town areas.
When strict influx control was introduced, limiting
labour movements, many of those remaining
entered into employment contracts in the monetary
sector and obtained temporary residential permits
to live outside the Ciskei.
The internal land settlement pattern in the Ciskei
still largely reflects a traditional pastoral subsis-
tence economy. In addition, most of the arable pro-
duction is destined for own household consump-
tion. Within the Ciskei there has been little
industrialisation and consequent urbanisation.
Except where dormitory urban areas have been
specifically created (both by deliberate policy and
by automatic default through the operation of the
pass laws') people do not live in large densely
populated areas. The peripheral dormitory towns
merely serve the needs of neighbouring South
African industrial complexes by providing a cheap
and ready supply of mainly unskilled labour. No
independent and efficient indigenous commercial
agricultural activities have yet been established to
serve the needs of the local population.
With this lack of commercial manufacturing and
agriculture, there has been virtually no internally
generated economic growth. Most regional cash
income arises from local labour employed either on
a contract basis in the mines or, perhaps more
commonly, in those manufacturing industries
located in the nearby industrial centres. It has
recently been estimated that 70 per cent of the total
'national income' of the Ciskei is derived from the
wage payments made by border industries to labour
commuters, most of whom cross the 'border' daily.
It is assumed in this paper that the principal
objective of any development programme should
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be to improve the conditions of the poor. But one of
the problems limiting any development strategy is
the lack of relevant data. Nevertheless, two basic
facts would be generally accepted: first, there is a
scarcity of resources; second, because of the low
level of development, there are many competing
demands on these resources.
These issues can be examined through three
questions:
- what is development and who benefits most
from it?
Development can be viewed as a) the maximisation
of (monetary) growth through rapid industrialisa-
tion; or b) as sharing equally in the process of
growth (which seems superficially to be somewhat
more equitable but actually implies growing real
disparities); or e) as a policy geared primarily
towards providing more goods and services th those
in most need - that is, the redistribution of re-
sources and public services in favour of the poor.
The problem, of course, is that the first two objec-
tives outlined (and particularly the first because it is
implicit in current 'homeland' policy) lead to
growing inequality and an increasing maldistribu-
tion of resources. This aggravates an already skew
distribution of income and wealth associated with
the existing imbalance of social and economic
power;
- what are the objectives of development in a
low income country?
If attention has to be directed towards specific pro-
jects, it is important to be able to exercise some
degree of independent choice. But this is not con-
ceivable when development is restricted by the type
of project a donor is prepared to support, by
budgetary constraints, or by dependence on exter-
nal finance within a rigid institutional framework.
This applies not only to the Ciskei but to any poor
dependent territory which relies heavily on external
resources and markets.
Thus the development objectives that poor regions
themselves would identify are usually defined in
terms of poverty alleviation, of better nutrition,
clean water, improved housing conditions, better
health and education, etc. These are often at
variance with other development objectives,
starting from different premises, and inheriting
more from the techniques and methods of planning.
They have to do with, for example, land settlement
or the development of human (labour) resources
and thus reflect means rather than ends. Develop-
ment objectives need to be defined in terms of
trying to identify choices and available resources.
The internal 'government' must establish a set of
objectives which it conceives as being the most im-
portant for the Ciskei. These objectives should be
concerned with improving the lot of the poorest 60,
70 or 80 per cent of the population. Establishing
such objectives rather than simply implementing
glossy physical planning proposals is necessary
because it is only against the definition of the real
problems that it is possible to assess whethèr pro-
gress is being made. There is nothing here which is
at variance with a physical development plan; but
conflicts will arise if the objectives defined for each
sector and programme reflect the implied objective
that industrialisation is the specific solution (as
opposed, for example, to the improvement of basic
arable or pastoral farming that would directly
benefit many small, poor rural landholders);
- what development model should be used in
order to achieve the objectives defined?
Every policy strategy implicitly assumes a model of
economic structure and the way a system operates.
In many cases, such as in 'homeland' policy, the
model is fairly explicit but it is not one that might
be chosen by the local government.2
Various explanations have been given for low levels
of savings and local investment - eg a poor resource
base, or limited local markets. But the Ciskei is not
independent and, particularly because there is
potentially a large local market for consumer
goods, other reasons for the lack of investment must
be found. A more profound explanation for the lack
of any real internal development must lie in struc-
tural and institutional factors common to the whole
South African economy and its international rela-
tions. Policy solutions which treat the development
problems of the Ciskei in isolation seem bound to
fail - and primarily for the same reasons that gave
rise to its creation in the first place. Efforts to solve
the resource related issues of agricultural and in-
dustrial development on the assumption that such a
regional economy is an enclosed watertight system
will undoubtedly prove inappropriate. More funda-
mental core-periphery dynamic relationships must
be taken into account. It is not relevant to apply
regional network analysis to try and identify pos-
sible growth points as appropriate centres on which
to concentrate the main development effort.
Although the methods and procedures themselves
are plausible the basic assumptions on which the
application of the techniques rest are clearly mis-
placed.
2Thus a Marxist approach, for example, would not even have the
chance to get off the ground.
Regional models of controlled imbalance aim to
establish urban growth centres to encourage
migration from the rural hinterland for employ-
ment in the towns. To concentrate, for reasons
primarily of cost efficiency (although rarely, in
practice, of cost effectiveness or comparative bene-
fit) economic nodes, social amenities and related
public services in the towns can serve only to aggra-
vate existing problems of poverty and income dis-
tribution. The closely related objective of effecting
large savings in the provision of public amenities
and social services can hardly be regarded as a
priority. Taken to its extreme, it would simply
imply the cutting out of all official services.
The logic of the growth centre approach, with its
emphasis on promoting dynamic internal economic
change, is fundamentally inconsistent. It is in con-
flict with the necessity to meet the needs of those
left behind in the economic growth process. Indeed
it may well be that growth centres succeed only
when they evolve without direct government inter-
vention. If an area has failed to develop without
outside help or official support then there would
appear to be little reason for assuming that it will
ever succeed as a growth centre as a result of deli-
berate government action. There is even less reason
for believing - especially in a homeland' context -
that there will be desirable 'spread' effects.
In the case of the Ciskei the almost 'ghost' town of
Middledrift, with little other merit than being
located virtually in the centre of the region, emerges
clearly (and not unexpectedly) as the primary
regional 'growth point' on the basis of the analytical
'centralising' techniques of physical planning.
Despite incorporating a variety of different physi-
cal, social, economic and cultural variables, the
technical investigatory procedure adopted provides
only a single (although admittedly complex and
multifaceted) dimension of the development
problem. The theoretical isolation of the region as a
separate entity must lead to incongruous results,
such as the identification of growth centres (like
Middledrift) that bear no relation to socio-
economic reality and are out of phase with the
dynamic forces at work.3 Moreover, the use of
sophisticated statistical techniques such as factor
analysis and the method of principal components
provides no justification for this approach. Indeed,
D. Page in À National Plan lbr 1/te Ciskei, Ciskei Development
Conference May 1978 (Report published by Conference Asso-
ciates Pretoria and printed by Cape and Transvaal Printers,
Parow, S. Africa) notes '. . . although Middledrift is the local
choice for the national industrial centre from the surveys of
potential, no development has yet taken place in spite of urgent
pleas to initiate development at this point. . .'. The testimony
speaks for itself.
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the concept of the nodal analysis may assume prin-
ciples that are the antithesis of development objec-
tives as commonly recognised.
What significant economic development that has
taken place within the Ciskei has been almost en-
tirely with the support of white expertise and
capital (mostly of an official nature). Many of these
schemes4 involve technologically efficient but
capital intensive choices of technique and depend
heavily on the continued supply of high level skill
inputs as well as on the easy availability of repairs,
servicing and spare parts, ie on supplies of white
labour and technology and imported goods and
services. This is particularly true of the dairy
farming project which - problably because the bulk
of the output is sold in distant urban centres outside
the region - insists on levels of hygiene and steril-
isation that are problably superfluous to the needs
of nearby local consumers. This puts the cost of
production, and hence the price, well above the
level which most local people can pay.
A regional planning approach that seems to make
sense is to conduct a general social cost-benefit
appraisal of each type of project proposed. Such an
analysis, however, should be dependent not so
much on criteria of economic efficiency as on the
broader development aims established. If the
motivation for production is profit, then conven-
tional techniques (suitably adjusted) would be ap-
propriate. But if the objective of production is to
meet a perceived need, then there is no place for
such a methodology. In assessing a self-help pro-
gramme in the Ciskei it should be neces-
sary first to judge whether dependence will be in-
creased. Do the projects have their own internal
momentum? Or, if outside skills and foreign capital
are withdrawn, will the project survive with local
resources?
lt is also important to examine the possible links
both between project activities and between pro-
jects and the local economy. Who will benefit from
a project in a region where there are few
internal inter-industry links? And who is going to
benefit from the expenditure generated by the
project? As far as existing development projects in
most 'homeland' areas are concerned, it is the
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powerful economic centres outside the region
which stand to benefit most.
In setting such broad questions, it is possible to
review agricultural or industrial project proposals
in the context of wider socio-economic develop-
ment aims. If the goal is regional self-help, in-
dustrial and agricultural projects will have to be
analysed in terms of conventional 'import' substi-
tution policies or 'export' promotion policies.
Import substitution policies may merely imply the
replacement of imports from neighbouring areas
through more efficient methods of domestic pro-
duction. But what about an import displacement
strategy? Import displacement arises when a need is
identified, and met with a locally produced good5
satisfying a similar consumption requirement to
that met previously by imports. Import displace-
ment probably has more chance in the Ciskei,
where price, income and product substitution
elasticities favour the manufacture of simple pro-
ducts with high transport costs.
There is much less opportunity for export promo-
tion, given the fierce competition from industrial-
ised areas in South Africa which have greater access
to communications and marketing facilities and
possess cheap labour and supporting industrial
structure. Moreover, other 'homeland' areas closer
to the main markets and the neighbouring inde-
pendent African countries can offer far more than
the Ciskei in this respect.
But a central ambiguity remains. Those evaluating
projects must do so in the context of the objectives
of the authority concerned. Is it possible in any real
sense to talk about the 'objectives' of the Ciskei
when the authority will be only the South African
Government under a different name? If this is so,
we must concern ourselves with the local objectives
of the South African Government. If these are to
keep the Ciskei as a labour reserve for white enter-
prise outside the area, or to provide a cover for
excluding Xhosa from any rights in the Republic,
then any assessment of projects on the basis
of their contribution to the welfare of the poor will
be at best irrelevant and at worst a deliberate
falsification.
Such as the Keiskammahoek migration settlements and Tyefu
scheme on the Fish River. and not the normal package of branded goods.
